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Abstract
Multi-item mechanisms can be very complex offering many different bundles to the buyer
that could even be randomized. Such complexity is thought to be necessary as the revenue gaps
between randomized and deterministic mechanisms, or deterministic and simple mechanisms are
huge even for additive valuations.
We challenge this conventional belief by showing that these large gaps can only happen
in restricted situations. These are situations where the mechanism overcharges a buyer for
a bundle while selling individual items at much lower prices. Arguably this is impractical in
many settings because the buyer can break his order into smaller pieces paying a much lower
price overall. Our main result is that if the buyer is allowed to purchase as many (randomized)
bundles as he pleases, the revenue of any multi-item mechanism is at most O(log n) times the
revenue achievable by item pricing, where n is the number of items. This holds in the most
general setting possible, with an arbitrarily correlated distribution of buyer types and arbitrary
valuations.
We also show that this result is tight in a very strong sense. Any family of mechanisms of
subexponential description complexity cannot achieve better than logarithmic approximation
even against the best deterministic mechanism and even for additive valuations. In contrast,
item pricing that has linear description complexity matches this bound against randomized
mechanisms.
1 Introduction
It is well known that revenue optimal mechanisms can be complicated: when a seller has more than
one item to sell to a buyer, the seller may price bundles of items rather than just the individual
items; better still the seller may offer random subsets of items, also called lotteries; even more
surprisingly, the seller may offer an infinitely large menu of such options. A primary line of enquiry
within algorithmic mechanism design aims to establish simplicity versus optimality tradeoffs: is it
possible to obtain some fraction of the optimal revenue via simple mechanisms, i.e. mechanisms
that can be described easily, understood easily, and are prevalent in practice?
To quantify this tradeoff let us introduce some standard notation. Let Rev denote the optimal
revenue obtained by using the most general kind of mechanism—a menu of lottery pricings. Let
DRev denote the optimal revenue achieved by a deterministic mechanism—a menu of bundle
pricings. Two “simple” mechanisms have been studied extensively in literature: item pricings,
where each item is assigned a price and the buyer can buy any subset at the sum of the constituent
prices; and bundle pricings, where every bundle is sold at a single constant price. The optimal
∗This work was supported in part by NSF grants CCF-1617505 and CCF-1704117. A preliminary announcement
of this work is to appear at the ACM EC’19 conference.
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revenues achievable by item pricings and bundle pricings are denoted SRev and BRev respectively.
The goal then is to bound the ratios Rev/DRev, or Rev/max(SRev,BRev), etc.
Briest et al. [6] were the first to show that revenue optimal mechanism design exhibits a par-
ticularly diabolical curse of dimensionality: whereas Rev/SRev is equal to 1 when the seller has
only one item to sell, the ratio becomes infinite with three items even if the buyer is unit demand.
Hart and Nisan [16] improved this to show that the ratio is infinite already with just two items.
In fact, if the buyer has additive values over two items, meaning that the value of the bundle of
two items is the sum over the individual item values, the ratio of Rev/DRev can also be infinite.1
Even focusing on just deterministic mechanisms, the situation is not much better: the ratio of
DRev to SRev can be as large as Ω(2n/n) with n items and additive values. Daskalakis in his
2014 survey [12] summarized the situation as such: “Multi-item auctions defy intuition.”
Further work along these lines suggested that the existence of a good tradeoff depends on proper-
ties of the buyer’s valuation – both the structure of the value function as well as the distribution from
which it is drawn. For example, two parallel lines of work investigating unit demand buyers [9, 11]
and additive valuation buyers [15, 17, 1] respectively established that when the buyer’s values for
different items are drawn independently, the larger of SRev and BRev is within a constant factor
of Rev. These results extend to more general settings with subadditive valuations [19, 8] as well as
multiple buyers [10, 21, 8, 7], but continue to require some degree of independence across individual
item values.2
Our work presents an alternate view of the simplicity versus optimality tradeoff. Our thesis
is that the curse of dimensionality only happens when buyers’ actions are restricted.
Let us illustrate through an example adapted from Hart and Nisan [16]. Consider a seller with n
items and a single buyer with additive values. Order all of the 2n−1 subsets of the items in weakly
increasing order of size, and let Si denote the ith set in this ordering. The buyer’s value function
is picked randomly from a set of 2n − 1 different types. The ith type is realized with probability
proportional to n−i and values every item in the set Si at ni/|Si| and every item not in Si at 0. It
is now straightforward to see that a mechanismM that offers the set Si at a price of ni−1 extracts
as revenue a 1/n fraction of the buyer’s total expected value, or Ω(2n/n)—for every i, the type i
buyer extracts the most utility by purchasing the set Si. On the other hand, the buyer’s expected
value is distributed according to the equal revenue distribution, and so any bundle pricing extracts
at most O(1) revenue and any item pricing extracts at most O(n). The implication is that optimal
deterministic mechanisms can obtain exponentially larger revenue than simple ones.
We notice that M disallows buyer from purchasing more than one set of items offered by the
seller. The single-buyer mechanism design problem is a convenient abstraction for settings with
unlimited supply and multiple i. i. d. buyers. Upon finding a (near-)optimal mechanism for the
single-buyer setting, we can apply the mechanism as-is in the latter setting, once for each buyer.
However, in that context, mechanisms such asM offer buyers opportunities for arbitrage. Consider,
in particular, a set Si of size 2. M sells both of the items in Si individually at a price no more than
a 1/n fraction of the price of Si. A buyer of type i can then participate in the mechanism twice,
purchasing the constituents of Si individually and paying far less to the mechanism than before.
1Note that for unit demand buyers DRev=SRev.
2[11], [19], and [5] allow item values to be correlated by being defined as linear functions over a common set
of random variables, but the latter is required to be independent. There is one notable exception. Psomas et
al. [18] perform an investigation of smoothed complexity for revenue optimal mechanism design over correlated value
distributions, where they studied the smoothed revenue achievable after the value distribution is perturbed slightly
in different ways.
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In effect, M is not Sybil-proof.
Single-buyer mechanisms can without loss of generality be described as menus of options where
each option is a random allocation (a.k.a. lottery) paired with a price. In this paper we study
Sybil-proof or buy-many mechanisms where the buyer is allowed to purchase any multi-set of
menu options (of arbitrary size).3 For deterministic menus, Sybil-proofness simply means that the
prices assigned to different menu options are subadditive over subsets of items. As a corollary, item
pricing and bundle pricing are already Sybil-proof. For general mechanisms, in fact, imposing the
constraint of Sybil-proofness greatly limits the extent to which mechanisms can price discriminate
between buyers of different types and, in particular, disallows the gap examples of Briest et al. and
Hart and Nisan.4
We can now again ask whether arbitrary, complicated Sybil-proof mechanisms can obtain un-
boundedly larger revenue (or, even exponentially or polynomially larger revenue, with respect to
the dimension n) relative to simple mechanisms. Our main result is that they cannot:
Theorem 1.1. For any arbitrary distribution over arbitrary valuation functions,
SybilProofRev
SRev
= O(log n).
Here SybilProofRev denotes the optimal revenue achievable through (potentially random-
ized) Sybil-proof mechanisms. Briest et al. [6] previously studied the gap between Sybil-proof
mechanisms5 and item pricings for the special case of unit-demand buyers and proved the same
upper bound. Our main contribution is to extend this result to arbitrary valuation functions and
distributions over valuations. Indeed we make no assumptions whatsoever on the buyer’s valuations
other than that they are monotone non-decreasing in the set of items allocated—allocating extra
items to the buyer never lowers his value.
Can we do even better? We show that the above result is tight in a very strong sense:
Theorem 1.2. There exists a distribution over additive values for which no mechanism with de-
scription complexity at most 2o(n
1/6) can obtain a o(log n) fraction of the optimal deterministic
Sybil-proof revenue.
Observe that item pricings can be described using O(n logR) bits when values lie in the range
[1, R]. We construct a distribution over additive values with R < n and a deterministic subadditive
pricing such that no mechanism that can be represented using 2o(n
1/6) bits can obtain a o(log n)
fraction of the revenue of the subadditive pricing. We further show that for single-minded buyers,
the gap cannot be improved in general even if the pricing we are comparing against is a submodular
function. Briest et al. previously showed a similar result for unit-demand buyers, namely that the
ratio SybilProofRevSRev can be Ω(log n).
3When the menu contains lotteries, there is a slight distinction between whether the buyer can select a multi-set
of options adaptively depending on outcomes of previous lotteries, or non-adaptively. Our results apply to both
settings.
4Babaioff et al. [3] previously observed that there can be a “small positive constant” revenue gap between Sybil-
proof and optimal mechanisms, without bounding such a constant from below. Our results imply that this gap is
unbounded.
5Briest et al. used the term “buy-many setting” for what we call Sybil-proof mechanisms.
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Menu size. Our results also have implications for the menu size complexity of optimal auctions.
The menu size of an auction, defined as the number of different outcomes the seller offers to
the buyer, has been studied extensively in literature as a measure of complexity for single-buyer
mechanisms (see, e.g., [16, 13, 2, 14]). One criticism of this notion of menu size is that some
mechanisms can be described much more succinctly than indicated by their menu size, as is the
case for item pricing. Hart and Nisan [16] introduced the alternate concept of “additive menu
size”, namely the number of “basic” options a buy-many mechanism offers, and showed that even
mechanisms with small additive menu size cannot capture a good fraction of the optimal revenue.
Our results show that allowing the buyer to purchase multiple options doesn’t just allow a more
succinct description of the mechanism, it also fundamentally changes the set of mechanisms available
to the seller. In particular, buy-many mechanisms with even infinite additive menu size cannot
capture any finite fraction of the overall optimal revenue Rev, as their revenue is bounded by
SybilProofRev.
Our work calls for a new investigation of additive menu-size complexity of Sybil-proof mecha-
nisms. A natural question, for example, is whether one can always obtain a constant fraction of the
optimal Sybil-proof revenue via mechanisms with finite additive menu size. If so, what menu size
is necessary to obtain a 1−  fraction of the optimal Sybil-proof revenue? Does it matter whether
the buyer can select multiple options adaptively or non-adaptively? We leave these questions to
future work.
Our techniques. Henceforth we will represent single-buyer mechanisms as pricing functions
that assign a price to every possible (random) allocation. For Sybil-proof mechanisms, this price
corresponds to the cheapest manner in which the buyer can acquire a (collection of) lottery(ies)
that dominates the desired random allocation. For a pricing function p and value function v, let
Revv(p) denote the revenue the mechanism p obtains from a buyer with value v. When v is drawn
from a distribution D, the mechanism’s expected revenue is Ev∼D[Revv(p)]. Our goal is to find for
any given Sybil-proof pricing p and distribution D, a “simple” pricing q, such that Ev∼D[Revv(q)]
is comparable to Ev∼D[Revv(p)].
As a first attempt towards this goal, we ask whether p can be “point-wise” approximated by q.
That is, does there exist a small c > 1 such that for all random allocations λ, q(λ)/c ≤ p(λ) ≤ q(λ)?
It turns out that for adaptively Sybil-proof pricings p,6 with q being an additive function, taking
c = n suffices. Since our eventual goal is to obtain an approximation to revenue in expectation
over a given value distribution, rather than point-wise over each possible lottery purchased, it is
reasonable to expect that a scaling-type argument would provide an O(log c) approximation. In
particular, let α be a random power of 2 between 1/c and 1, and let αq denote the pricing where
every price in q is scaled by the factor α. Then it holds that for any λ, with probability 1/ log(c),
αq(λ) is within [1/2, 1] times p(λ). The implication is that a buyer purchasing λ under p would
still be interested in purchasing λ at the cheaper price offered by αq, while paying at least half of
what he was paying under p. However, there is a fallacy in this argument: a buyer that purchases
λ under p may switch to purchasing a much cheaper allocation when offered the pricing αq. Our
main technical contribution is in dealing with the buyer’s incentives to argue that even if the buyer
switches allocations, the resulting revenue is still significant large.
Formally we prove the following theorem, that may be of independent interest. The theorem
6Non-adaptive Sybil-proofness requires some extra work in dealing with lotteries that have valuable items at very
very low probabilities of allocation.
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states that if a pricing function q point-wise c-approximates a pricing function p, then a particu-
lar (random) scaling of q obtains an O(log c)-approximation in revenue to p with respect to any
arbitrary distribution over valuation functions.
Theorem 1.3. For any c > 1, let p and q be any two pricing functions satisfying q(λ)/c ≤ p(λ) ≤
q(λ) for all random allocations λ ∈ ∆(2[n]). Then there exists a distribution over “scaling factors”
α ∈ [1/2c, 1] such that for any valuation function v, Eα[Revv(αq)] ≥ 12 log(2c)Revv(p).
Theorem 1.3 shows that approximating a pricing function pointwise suffices to obtain a good
approximation to the revenue.
Our lower bounds are obtained by considering a weaker notion of approximation of a pricing
function p using another function q that exactly captures the revenue tradeoff over many natural
valuation classes. It only requires the approximation be accurate in expectation over the “demand
distribution”, i.e. the distribution over sets that are bought when the function p is offered as a
price menu to the buyer. We say that a pricing function q, c-approximates from below the pricing
function p over the demand distribution Π if,
ES∼Π
[
q(S)1q(S)≤p(S)
] ≥ 1
c
ES∼Π[p(S)] (1)
Note that the expectation in the right hand side of (1) is exactly the revenue of p, while the
expectation in the left hand side is a proxy for the revenue of q. It assumes that the demand
distribution over sets remains the same but a set is bought only if its price under q is not higher
than its price under p.
In fact, there is a distribution over single-minded buyers7 for which the expected revenues of
p and q are exactly equal to the expressions above: we pick a set S from the distribution Π and
assign a value of p(S) to every superset of S, including itself, and a value of 0 everywhere else.
Our lower bounds show that under this weaker notion of approximation, functions q with
subexponential description complexity cannot obtain better than O(log n) approximation, even for
submodular pricing functions p. This directly implies that no simple mechanism can get better
than logarithmic approximation to the optimal revenue for single minded-buyers (Theorem 4.1)
and also extends to the case of additive buyers (Theorem 4.4).
While in general better-than-logarithmic approximation with simple mechanisms is not possible
even for simple valuations, in Appendix B we offer improved upper bounds in special cases where
the demand distribution has additional structure.
2 Notation and definitions
We study the following single-buyer mechanism design problem. A seller has n heterogeneous
items to sell to a single buyer. The buyer’s type is given by a valuation function v that assigns
non-negative values to every set of items: v : 2[n] → R+0 . Values are monotone, meaning that for
any S and T with S ⊂ T ⊆ [n], v(S) ≤ v(T ). The buyer’s type is drawn from an arbitrary known
distribution D over the set of all possible valuation functions.
Any selling mechanism can be described as a menu of options, each of which assigns a price to
a random allocation or lottery. Let ∆ = ∆(2[n]) denote the set of all probability distributions over
7Single-minded buyers are interested in buying a specific subset S of items at some value.
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sets of items and λ ∈ ∆ denote a “lottery” or random allocation. We describe a mechanism using
a pricing function p : ∆→ R+0 ; The price assigned to a lottery λ ∈ ∆ is then given by p(λ).8
If a buyer with valuation v buys a lottery λ ∈ ∆ at price p(λ), her utility from the purchase is
given by
u(v, p, λ) := ES∼λ[v(S)]− p(λ).
If a buyer with valuation v purchases a multiset Λ = {λ1, λ2, · · · , λk} of lotteries with price function
p, her utility from the purchase is given by
u(v, p,Λ) := ESi∼λi∀i∈[k]
[
v
(⋃
i
Si
)]
−
∑
i∈[k]
p(λi).
We sometimes use v(λ) as shorthand for ES∼λ[v(S)] and v(Λ) likewise for the value assigned to the
union of sets drawn from a multiset Λ of lotteries.
Sybil-proofness and optimal revenue. We say that a lottery λ dominates another lottery (or
a multiset of lotteries) λ′ if there exists a coupling between a random draw S from λ and a random
draw (or union of draws) S′ from λ′ such that S is a superset of S′. We are now ready to define
Sybil-proofness.
Definition 2.1. A mechanism or pricing p : ∆ → R+0 is Sybil-proof if for every multiset Λ of
lotteries there exists a single lottery λ dominating it that is no more expensive: p(λ) ≤∑λ′∈Λ p(λ′).
Observe that if a lottery λ dominates another lottery (or a multiset of lotteries) λ′, then any
buyer with a monotone valuation function obtains higher expected value from λ than from λ′. We
therefore get the following observation:
Fact 2.1. Given any Sybil-proof pricing p, for any buyer type v it is optimal for the buyer to
purchase a single lottery λ = arg maxλ∈∆(v(λ)− p(λ)).
Given a Sybil-proof pricing p, we use λp(v) := arg maxλ∈∆(v(λ) − p(λ)) to denote the lottery
purchased by a buyer with value function v, and u(v, p) as the corresponding utility achieved. For
convenience, we overload notation and use p(v) := p(λp(v)) to denote the price paid by the buyer.
Given a distribution D over buyer types, we write RevD(p) := Ev∼D[p(v)] as the revenue of the
pricing p. The optimal Sybil-proof revenue for distribution D is given as follows; we drop the
subscript D when it is clear from the context.
SybilProofRevD := max
Sybil-proof pricings p
RevD(p).
8Since we are not investigating menu size, we will assume that the pricing assigns a price to every lottery. It is
easy to extend a partial pricing to a complete one: we assign to every lottery the price of the cheapest option that
dominates it, or a price of infinity if no such option exists. For Sybil-proof pricings, we define the price for some
lottery λ as being the cheapest way to assemble a random allocation λ′ that first-order stochastically dominates λ.
See below for a formal definition of dominance among lotteries.
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Adaptive Sybil-proofness. Our definition of Sybil-proofness guards against buyers that pur-
chase multiple options from the given menu and receive a random allocation for each. The buyer
can perform even better if these menu options are selected sequentially and adaptively—that is, if
the buyer observes the instantiation of each random allocation before deciding whether and what
to purchase next. Guarding against such an adaptive buyer places a further restriction on the
prices the mechanism can charge. Let A denote a buying strategy, that is, an adaptive sequence of
lotteries. Let ΛA denote the (random) sequence of lotteries bought in A. As before, we say that
A is dominated by a lottery λ if there exists a coupling between a random draw S from λ and a
random union of draws S′ from ΛA such that S is a superset of S′. We can now define a more
restrictive definition of Sybil-proofness:
Definition 2.2. A mechanism or pricing p : ∆ → R+0 is Adaptively Sybil-proof if for every
adaptive buying strategy A there exists a single lottery λ dominating it that is cheaper: p(λ) ≤
EΛA
[∑
λ′∈ΛA p(λ
′)
]
.
Of course there is no way for the seller to enforce whether buyers can make purchasing de-
cisions adaptively or non-adaptively, so it is natural to study mechanisms satisfying adaptive
Sybil-proofness. Competing against optimal adaptively Sybil-proof mechanisms makes some of
our arguments easier. However, all of our positive results also apply to the less restrictive notion
of (non-adaptive) Sybil-proofness.
Deterministic mechanisms. Deterministic mechanisms price only deterministic sets (a.k.a.
bundles) of items—p : 2[n] → R+0 . A deterministic pricing p is Sybil-proof if and only if it is
monotone and subadditive, that is, for any S1 ⊂ S2 ⊆ [n], p(S1) ≤ p(S2), and for any set of
bundles, T ⊆ 2[n], the prices of the union of bundles is no more than the sum of individual bundle
prices:
∑
S∈T p(S) ≥ p(∪S∈T S). The optimal deterministic Sybil-proof revenue for distribution D
is given as follows.
DetSybilProofRevD := max
Deterministic monotone
subadditive pricings p
RevD(p).
Simple pricings. An item pricing is a deterministic additive pricing: p(S) =
∑
i∈S p({i}) for
all S ⊆ [n]. A bundle pricing is a constant pricing that assigns the same price to every set:
p(S) = p([n]) for all S ⊆ [n]. Observe that item pricings and bundle pricings are always Sybil-
proof. We use SRev and BRev to denote the optimal revenue achievable using item pricings and
bundle pricings respectively (over an implicit distribution D).
3 Approximation via item pricing
In this section we present our main upper bound, namely that the ratio between SybilProofRevD
and SRevD is bounded by O(log n) for any value distribution D. This result is based on ideas that
are present implicitly in the work of Briest et al. [6] for unit-demand buyers. We formalize and
extend these ideas to arbitrary valuations.
Our argument proceeds in two parts. First, we show that in order to approximate the expected
revenue of a pricing p with a pricing q within some factor β, it suffices to obtain a point-wise
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2O(β)-approximation of p via q. Then we show that adaptively Sybil-proof pricings p can be point-
wise n-approximated by additive pricings. This provides a bound on the gap between adaptive
SybilProofRevD and SRevD. In the last part of this section, we extend our result to non-
adaptively Sybil-proof pricings.
3.1 Point-wise approximation implies revenue approximation
Suppose that we have two pricing functions p and q that are close on every possible (random)
allocation. In particular, for some c > 1, we have q(λ)/c ≤ p(λ) ≤ q(λ) for every random allocation
λ ∈ ∆. We say that q point-wise c-approximates p. We will now prove Theorem 1.3, namely that
a point-wise c-approximation implies an O(log c)-approximation in revenue.
Theorem 1.3. For any c > 1, let p and q be any two pricing functions satisfying q(λ)/c ≤ p(λ) ≤
q(λ) for all random allocations λ ∈ ∆(2[n]). Then there exists a distribution over “scaling factors”
α ∈ [1/2c, 1] such that for any valuation function v, Eα[Revv(αq)] ≥ 12 log(2c)Revv(p).
Our argument considers a suite of pricings {αq} defined over a range of scale factors α ∈ [1/2c, 1].
We want to argue that this suite of pricings collectively obtains good revenue from every buyer
type. At the heart of our argument is the following observation: for any buyer type, if the buyer
obtains much larger utility at low prices ( 12cq) than at high prices (q), we can capture a good
fraction of this difference in utilities as revenue by picking a scaling factor α from an appropriate
distribution independent of the buyer’s type. We formalize this observation as Lemma 3.1 below.
We then argue that if q point-wise approximates p, then this difference of utilities is proportional
to the revenue obtained by p from the buyer.
Lemma 3.1. For any pricing q and any 0 < ` ≤ h, let α be drawn from [`, h] with density function
1
α log(h/`) . Then, for any valuation function v,
Eα[Revv(αq)] ≥ u(v, `q)− u(v, hq)
log(h/`)
.
To understand the lemma, consider starting at α = ` and gradually increasing the scaling factor
and, correspondingly, prices. As the prices increases, the buyer’s utility from purchasing his favorite
bundle weakly decreases. As long as the buyer continues to buy the same lottery, this decrease
in utility is captured as revenue. At certain price points the buyer switches to buying a different
lottery, causing the revenue to drop discontinuously. Other than these discontinuities, however, the
buyer’s loss in utility is captured exactly as increase in revenue (see Figure 1). This observation
allows us to relate the gradient of the revenue as a function of the scaling factor α to the gradient
of the utility. Our next observation is that because revenue depends linearly on the scaling factor
α (except at the break points), the revenue is proportional to its gradient. Then by picking an
appropriate distribution on α, we can capture exactly this gradient as expected revenue. We now
present this argument formally.
Proof. Consider a buyer with value function v. Let uv(α) denote the utility the buyer derives when
offered the pricing αq, and λα denote the corresponding lottery purchased:
uv(α) = max
λ∈∆
(v(λ)− αq(λ))
λα = arg maxλ∈∆ (v(λ)− αq(λ)).
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Figure 1: Utility and revenue as function of the scaling factor α. Our goal is to find a distribution on α
such that the expected revenue (red curve) is proportional to the change in utility (blue curve).
By the envelope theorem it holds that uv
′(α) = ddα(v(λα) − αq(λα)) = −q(λα). Therefore, the
seller’s revenue from this buyer is given by
αq(λα) = −αuv ′(α).
Now, consider picking α from the equal revenue distribution over [`, h] with density function
1/(α log(h/`)), and offering the buyer the pricing αq. Then, the expected revenue from this buyer
is: ∫ h
`
αq(λα) · 1
α log(h/`)
dα =
−1
log(h/`)
∫ h
`
uv
′(α)dα =
uv(`)− uv(h)
log(h/`)
.
We are now ready to complete the proof of Theorem 1.3.
Proof of Theorem 1.3. Fix a buyer valuation v, and let h = 1 and ` = 1/2c. We will bound the
utility the buyer derives under pricings `q and hq in terms of his utility under p.
u(v, `q) = max
λ∈∆
(
v(λ)− 1
2c
q(λ)
)
≥ max
λ∈∆
(
v(λ)− 1
2
p(λ)
)
≥ u(v, p) + 1
2
p(v).
On the other hand,
u(v, hq) = max
λ∈∆
(v(λ)− q(λ)) ≤ max
λ∈∆
(v(λ)− p(λ)) = u(v, p).
We can now apply Lemma 3.1 to obtain a revenue of at least 12 log(2c)p(v) from the buyer.
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3.2 Upper bound for adaptively Sybil-proof pricings
As a warm-up to our main theorem, we show how Theorem 1.3 can be directly applied to get an
upper bound on SybilProofRevD/SRevD for adaptively Sybil-proof pricings. We first briefly
sketch the proof for deterministic Sybil-proof pricings. Recall that deterministic Sybil-proof pricings
are monotone subadditive functions. Let p be any such pricing. Then, by defining q to be identical
to p over singletons (q({i}) = p({i}) for all i ∈ [n]) and extending it additively to bundles (q(S) =∑
i∈S q({i})), we observe on the one hand that q is no smaller than p on any set S. On the other
hand, p(S) is at least as large as the price of the most expensive singleton item in S, which is at least
as large as the average price of an item in S, or q(S)/n. Therefore, q point-wise n-approximates p.
We can therefore apply Theorem 1.3 to obtain an O(log n) approximation to the expected revenue
of p under any value distribution. We now formalize this argument for randomized adaptively
Sybil-proof pricings.
Theorem 3.2. For any distribution D, we have AdaptSybilProofRevD ≤ O(log n)SRevD.
Proof. Let p be the adaptive Sybil-proof pricing that achieves revenue AdaptSybilProofRevD.
We again begin by defining base prices for each of the items. Informally, these are the minimum
prices the buyer needs to pay in expectation to obtain item i with certainty:
q({i}) = min
λ∈∆
p(λ)
Pr[i ∈ λ]
where we write Pr[i ∈ λ] as shorthand for PrS∼λ[i ∈ S]. Let λi denote the lottery that defines the
price for item i: λi = arg minλ∈∆
p(λ)
Pr[i∈λ] . For every λ ∈ ∆, q(λ) =
∑
S⊆[n] λ(S)
∑
i∈S q({i}).
Observe that for any lottery λ ∈ ∆, the adaptive buyer can draw a set T from λ and purchase this
set by purchasing for every i ∈ T the lottery λi repeatedly until he obtains the item. The expected
price paid by the buyer in this strategy is precisely ET∼λ[q(T )] =
∑
i∈[n](q({i}) Pr[i ∈ λ]) = q(λ).
Since p is adaptively Sybil-proof, we have p(λ) ≤ q(λ).
On the other hand, by the definition of q, p(λ) ≥ q({i}) Pr[i ∈ λ] and therefore, summing over
all i ∈ [n] and dividing by n, we have p(λ) ≥ 1nq(λ). Taking c = n in Theorem 1.3 finishes the
proof.
3.3 Upper bound for general randomized Sybil-proof pricings
We will now prove our main theorem:
Theorem 1.1. For any arbitrary distribution over arbitrary valuation functions,
SybilProofRev
SRev
= O(log n).
As in our argument for the adaptive setting, consider any Sybil-proof pricing p and let us define
the pricing q as:
q({i}) = min
λ∈∆
p(λ)
Pr[i ∈ λ] ∀i ∈ [n] and q(S) =
∑
i∈S
q({i}) ∀S ⊆ [n].
Our goal, as before, is to argue that q point-wise approximates p. It is straightforward to argue
that p(λ) ≥ 1nq(λ) for all λ ∈ ∆. However, it is no longer necessarily true that p(S) ≤ q(S) for all
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sets S of items. This is because acquiring the set S non-adaptively with certainty under p may cost
much more than q(S). This in turn implies that the buyer’s utility under q may be larger than his
utility under p. Indeed no matter how large of a scaling factor h we pick, it is tricky to directly
argue that u(v, hq) ≤ u(v, p). Instead, we will argue that if the set S the buyer wants to purchase
under hq is too expensive to purchase under p, this happens because some high value item in S can
only be bought with very low probability in p. We will use such items as the basis to construct a
different additive pricing that obtains a good fraction of the revenue of p. We now formalize this
argument.
Proof. Let p be the Sybil-proof pricing that achieves revenue SybilProofRevD. Let ` = 1/2n,
h = 4n, and define the pricing q as above. Let α be picked from the range [`, h] with density
function 1/(α log(h/`)). Then for any valuation function v, it is straightforward to observe that
u(v, `q) ≥ u(v, p) + p(v)/2. We will now focus on bounding u(v, hq).
Let Th be the set purchased by the buyer when offered the pricing hq. Then u(v, hq) = v(Th)−
hq(Th). We want to bound this utility in terms of the utility the buyer gets under the pricing p,
so let us consider how much it would cost the buyer to acquire Th under p. In particular, fix some
number m and suppose that the buyer purchases a multiset Λm that contains mi = d mPr[i∈λi]e copies
of λi for all i ∈ Th. Then, the probability that some i ∈ Th does not belong to the random allocation
drawn from this multiset is at most (1−Pr[i ∈ λi])mi < 2−m. Accordingly, the probability that Th
is not a subset of the random allocation drawn from Λm is at most n2
−m. The total price of Λm is∑
i∈Thd mPr[i∈λi]e p(λi) ≤ (m+ 1)
∑
i∈Th q({i}) = (m+ 1)q(Th). We therefore have:
u(v, p) ≥ u(v, p,Λm) ≥ (1− n2−m)v(Th)− (m+ 1)q(Th) for all m.
Now, let k be defined such that n2−kv(Th) = q(Th), that is, k = log(nv(Th)/q(Th)). Then we
get:
u(v, p) ≥ v(Th)− (k + 2)q(Th) and,
u(v, hq) ≤ u(v, p) + (k + 2− h)q(Th). (2)
Now, if k + 2 ≤ h, then we already have the bound we desire. So, for the remainder of the proof,
assume that k > h − 2 ≥ 3n. We will construct a different item pricing to recover the quantity
(k + 2− h)q(Th) < kq(Th) as revenue from the buyer with value v.
For any T ⊆ [n] and positive integer a, the (uniform) item pricing g˜T,a is defined as follows:
g˜T,a(S) = 2
a+nq(T )|S| for all S ⊆ [n]. Now consider a buyer with value function v and with
k = log(nv(Th)/q(Th)). When offered the pricing g˜Th,a with a < k− n− 2 log n, this buyer obtains
a utility of at least v(Th) − g˜Th,a(Th) ≥ v(Th) − 2a+nnq(Th) > v(Th) − 1n2kq(Th) = 0. Therefore,
the buyer buys at least one item under this pricing and pays at least 2a+nq(Th). In other words,
g˜Th,a(v) ≥ 2a+nq(Th) for a < k − n− 2 log n.
Let T be drawn from the uniform distribution over 2[n] and a be drawn from the geometric distri-
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bution with mean 2, that is, Pr[a = x] = 2−x−1 for every x ∈ N. Then, we get:
ET,a[Revv(g˜T,a)] ≥ 1
2n
k−n−2 logn−1∑
a=0
1
2a+1
2a+nq(Th)
=
1
2
(k − n− 2 log n− 1)q(Th)
≥ 1
4
kq(Th) for k ≥ h− 2. (3)
Finally we apply Lemma 3.1 with h = 4n and ` = 1/2n:
log(8n2)Eα[αq(v)] = u(v, `q)− u(v, hq) = u(v, p)− u(v, hq) + 1
2
p(v) (4)
Putting together Equations (2), (3), and (4), we get that for any buyer valuation v:
log(8n2)Eα[Revv(αq)] + 4ET,a[Revv(g˜T,a)] ≥ 1
2
p(v).
The theorem now follows by taking expectations over the valuation function v and recalling that
{αq} and {g˜T,a} are all additive pricing functions.
4 Lower Bound
In this section we present our main lower bound, namely that the O(log n) approximation achieved
in the previous section is tight in a very strong sense. We show that there exists a distribution
over additive buyer types such that no mechanism with sub-exponential description complexity can
o(log n)-approximate the revenue from optimal deterministic Sybil-proof pricing. This implies in
particular that no simple mechanism can achieve better than logarithmic approximation, including
popular mechanisms studied in previous work such as selling separately, selling the grand-bundle,
partition mechanisms or any combination of these mechanisms.
Before presenting our results for additive buyers, we first consider the simpler case where buyers
are single-minded, i.e. they are only interested in purchasing a single set.
Our construction proceeds by identifying a large class of subadditive functions that assign
independently arbitrary values in [n1/6, n1/3] to exponentially many sets S1, S2, · · · , SN . For any
function p in this class, pricing according to p extracts full surplus from a distribution over single
minded buyers where a buyer wanting set Si has value p(Si). Getting an O(log n) approximation
for such a distribution as in the previous section is easy by setting the same price for every subset
since there are only O(log n) different scales of prices to choose from. However, to obtain a better
approximation one would need to charge high or low prices at different sets which requires at least
one bit per set to describe. As there are exponentially many sets, mechanisms with subexponential
description complexity cannot obtain better than logarithmic approximation.
4.1 The basic construction and a lower bound for single-minded buyers
Let p and q be any two functions defined over the subsets of [n]. Let Π be a demand distribution
over sets, Π ∈ ∆(2[n]). We will say that q c-approximates p from below over Π if the following
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holds:
ES∼Π
[
q(S)1q(S)≤p(S)
] ≥ 1
c
ES∼Π[p(S)] .
Our argument will proceed in two parts. First, we will show that for any “small” class of functions
q, there exists a subadditive (in fact, submodular) p and a distribution Π such that no q in the
class can o(log n)-approximate p from below over Π. Then we will show that for any p and Π of the
form constructed in the first step, there exists a distribution over valuation functions such that the
optimal subadditive revenue is a constant fraction of ES∼Π[p(S)], while the revenue of any other
function q is exactly ES∼Π
[
q(S)1q(S)≤p(S)
]
for single-minded buyers. Together this will imply the
following theorem.
Theorem 4.1. For any large enough n, there exists a distribution D over single-minded valuation
functions over n items and a deterministic submodular pricing function p such that RevD(p) is a
factor of Ω(log n) larger than the revenue of any pricing that can be described using 2o(n
1/6) bits.
Let us begin by describing the class of subadditive functions p that we will use in our argument.
Let S = {S1, S2, · · · , SN} be a collection of N subsets of [n]. Let β = (b1, · · · , bN ) be a vector of
integers of size N , where each coordinate is picked from the range [bmin, bmax]. We define a partial
function pS,β as follows: for all Si ∈ S, set pS,β(Si) = bi. The following lemma follows from the
work of Balcan and Harvey [4] and shows that we can pick both N and bmax/bmin to be sufficiently
large while ensuring that p is submodular.9 See the appendix for a proof.
Lemma 4.2. Let N = 2n
1/6/8, bmin = n
1/6, and bmax = n
1/3. Then, there exists a collection of
sets S = {S1, S2, · · · , SN}, such that for each i |Si| = n1/3; for each i 6= j, |Si ∩Sj | ≤ n1/6; and for
any integral vector β ∈ [bmin, bmax]N , the partial function pS,β can be completed to a matroid rank
function.
Let Π be the uniform distribution over the collection S. Our next lemma argues that for any
small class of functions Q, there exists a vector β, such that no function in Q can c-approximate
pS,β from below over Π. Observe that because Π only places non-zero mass over sets in S, we do
not need to specify a completion of pS,β for this lemma.
Lemma 4.3. Let m = log(bmax/bmin), c ≤ m/8, and Q be an arbitrary class of functions defined
over the subsets of [n] with |Q| ≤ 2o(N/4m). Then there exists an integral vector β ∈ [bmin, bmax]N
such that no function q ∈ Q can c-approximate pS,β from below over Π.
Proof. Fix a function q ∈ Q. We will pick β from a distribution and show that the probability that
q c-approximates the corresponding function pS,β is small. For each i ∈ [N ], draw bi independently
according to the following truncated geometric distribution: Pr[bi = 2
kbmin] =
2−k
1−2−m for 1 ≤ k ≤
m. Let hi = q(Si)1q(Si)≤pS,β(Si) be a random variable that depends on β. Then the statement that
q c-approximates pS,β from below over Π is equivalent to the statement that∑
i∈[N ]
hi ≥ 1
c
∑
i∈[N ]
pS,β(Si). (5)
9Matroid rank functions are a subclass of monotone submodular functions, which in turn are a subclass of all
monotone subadditive functions.
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Observe that over the randomness in β, the variables hi are independent and bounded. For all
i, hi ≤ pS,β(Si) ≤ 2mbmin. Furthermore,
E[hi] = q(Si) Pr[pS,β(Si) ≥ q(Si)] ≤ q(Si)2bmin
q(Si)
= 2bmin.
On the other hand,
E[pS,β(Si)] = E[bi] =
m
1− 2−m bmin.
We can now bound the probability that (5) holds by applying concentration to the sums of hi and
pS,β(Si) respectively.
Pr
β
[∑
i
hi ≥ 1
c
∑
i
pS,β(Si)
]
≤ Pr
[∑
i
hi ≥ 1
2c
E
[∑
i
pS,β(Si)
]]
+ Pr
[∑
i
pS,β(Si) <
1
2
E
[∑
i
pS,β(Si)
]]
= Pr
[∑
i
hi ≥ m
2c(1− 2−m)Nbmin
]
+ Pr
[∑
i
pS,β(Si) <
m
2(1− 2−m)Nbmin
]
≤ exp
(
−
2( m
2c(1−2−m)Nbmin − 2Nbmin)2
N(2mbmin)2
)
+ exp
(
−
2( m
2(1−2−m)Nbmin)
2
N(2mbmin)2
)
= O(2−N4
−m
).
Here the third line uses Hoeffding’s inequality by observing that 0 ≤ hi, pS,β(Si) ≤ 2mbmin; the last
line follows using c ≤ m/8. The lemma now follows by taking the union bound over all q ∈ Q.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 4.1.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Let bmin, bmax, N , and S be as given in Lemma 4.2. Let Π be the uniform
distribution over S. Let m = log(bmax/bmin), c = m/8 = Ω(log n), and observe that the class Q of
all pricings that can be described using 2o(n
1/6) bits has size 2o(N/4
m). So we can apply Lemma 4.3
to obtain a vector β.
Now we will define a distribution D over valuation functions as follows. For i ∈ [N ], let vi
be the function that takes on value bi over any superset of Si and value 0 otherwise. Function
vi is instantiated with probability 1/N . Let p be the completion of pS,β as given by Lemma 4.2.
Consider a pricing function that assigns a price of 12p(S) to any set S ⊆ [n]. Since this function
is subadditive and a buyer with value vi is single-minded and can afford to buy the set Si, the
mechanism obtains a revenue of 12p(Si) from this buyer. The mechanism’s expected revenue over
the distribution D is then 12ES∼Π[pS,β(S)].
On the other hand, for any monotone pricing function q, a buyer with value function vi purchases
the set Si if and only if q(Si) ≤ vi(Si) = bi = pS,β(Si). Therefore, the revenue of such a function q
over D is at most ES∼Π
[
q(S)1q(S)≤p(S)
]
.
The theorem now follows by applying Lemma 4.3.
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4.2 A lower bound for additive buyers
We now extend our lower bound to additive value buyers. Our construction is similar to that
for Theorem 4.1 but there are some subtle differences. As before, let S = {S1, S2, · · · , SN} and
β = (b1, · · · , bN ) ∈ [bmin, bmax]N . We now state and prove our lower bound for additive buyers.
Theorem 4.4. For any large enough n, there exists a distribution D over additive valuation func-
tions over n items and a deterministic monotone subadditive pricing function p such that RevD(p)
is a factor of Ω(log n) larger than the revenue of any mechanism that can be described using 2o(n
1/6)
bits.
Proof. Let N and S be as defined in Lemma 4.2. Let bmin = 2n1/6, bmax = n1/3, and fix an integral
vector β ∈ [bmin, bmax]N . Consider the following distribution Dβ over value functions. For i ∈ [N ],
vi,β is an additive function that takes on the value bi/|Si| over all items in Si, and 0 on items not in
Si. Observe that vi,β is a uniform additive valuation and vi,β(Si) = bi. Function vi,β is instantiated
with probability 1/N .
Now consider the pricing function pS,β defined over the sets in S as pS,β(Si) = 12bi for all Si ∈ S,
and extended to arbitrary sets in the natural way: pS,β(S) = minA⊆[N ]:∪i∈ASi⊇S
∑
i∈A pS,β(Si).
Observe that pS,β(Si) < vi,β(Si). We claim that pS,β is subadditive and therefore extracts revenue
1
2bi from the buyer with type vi,β. To see this, recall that the buyer obtains positive utility from the
set Si. Suppose the buyer instead decides to buy the collection Si1 , Si2 , · · · , Sik . Since |Sij ∩ Si| ≤
n1/6, vi,β(Si1 ∪ Si2 ∪ · · · ∪ Sik) ≤ kn−1/6bi. Thus his utility from buying these sets is at most
kn−1/6bi −
k∑
j=1
1
2
bij ≤ kn−1/6bmax −
1
2
kbmin = 0.
Therefore, we have pS,β(vi,β) = pS,β(Si).
Now let Q be the class of mechanisms/pricings in the statement of the theorem and fix any
q ∈ Q. We will again define a distribution over instances by defining a distribution over the vectors
β, as in the proof of Lemma 4.3. Let m = log(bmax/bmin). For all i ∈ [N ], draw bi independently
from the following truncated geometric distribution: Pr[bi = 2
kbmin] =
2−k
1−2−m for 1 ≤ k ≤ m.
Let hi = q(vi,β) be the revenue q obtained from the buyer with value function vi,β. Observe
that hi is a random variable that depends on bi. As before, the variables hi are independent and
bounded by 2mbmin. Furthermore, we can bound the expectation of hi by observing that a buyer
with valuation vi,β is an additive buyer with uniform values over items in Si. Selling a subset of
items to this buyer is equivalent to selling fractional amounts of a single item to a single-parameter
buyer. The optimal revenue from this buyer, over the randomness in bi, is bounded by the revenue
of single posted price. Therefore, E[hi] ≤ 2bmin. We now apply the same concentration argument
as in the proof of Lemma 4.3 to obtain
Pr
β
[∑
i
hi ≥ 1
c
∑
i
pS,β(Si)
]
≤ O(2−N4−m).
The theorem now follows by taking the union bound over q ∈ Q.
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A Deferred proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 4.2
Lemma 4.2. Let N = 2n
1/6/8, bmin = n
1/6, and bmax = n
1/3. Then, there exists a collection of
sets S = {S1, S2, · · · , SN}, such that for each i |Si| = n1/3; for each i 6= j, |Si ∩Sj | ≤ n1/6; and for
any integral vector β ∈ [bmin, bmax]N , the partial function pS,β can be completed to a matroid rank
function.
Proof. We need the following lemmas from [4].
Lemma A.1. (Theorem 9 of [4]) Let µ and τ be non-negative integers. f : 2[N ] → R is called
(µ, τ)-large if f(J) ≥ 0, ∀|J | < τ ; f(J) ≥ µ, ∀τ ≤ |J | ≤ 2τ−2. Then for any sets S1, · · · , SN ⊆ [n],
I = {I : |I| ≤ µ ∧ |I ∩ S(J)| ≤ f(J),∀J ⊆ [N ], |J | < τ} is the family of independent sets of a
matroid, here S(J) =
⋃
j∈J Sj.
Lemma A.2. (Theorem 13 of [4]) Let G(U ∪ V,E) be bipartite graph. G is called a d, L, -lossless
expander if Γ(u) = d, ∀u ∈ U ; Γ(J) ≥ (1 − )d|J |, ∀J ⊆ U, |J | ≤ L. Then if |U | = N , |V | = n,
d ≥ 2 logN/, n ≥ 6Ld/, a (d, L, )-lossless expander exists.
17
We prove that for N = 2n
1/6/8, d = bmax = µ = n
1/3, bmin = n
1/6,  = bmin4µ =
1
4n1/6
, τ =
2µ
bmin
= 2n1/6, L = 2τ = 4n1/6, there exists S1, · · · , SN such that for any b1, · · · , bN ∈ [bmin, bmax],
f(Si) = bi is a matroid rank function.
Let Sj = Γ({j}) in the lossless expander (can check feasible under parameters above). Then
|Sj | = d = n1/3, |Si ∩ Sj | = |Si| + |Sj | − |Γ({i, j})| ≤ 2d − (1 − )2d < n1/6. Let h(J) =∑
j∈J bj − (µ|J | − |S(J)|).
Lemma A.3. h is (µ, τ)-large.
Proof. Notice that h(J) ≥ bmin|J | − |J |µ = 3µ|J |. When |J | ≤ τ , h(J) ≥ 0; when |J | > τ ,
h(J) ≥ 3µτ = 1.5µ > µ.
By Theorem A.1, I = {|I| ≤ µ ∧ |I ∩ S(J)| ≤ h(J), ∀|J | < τ} is the family of independent sets
of a matroid. For any Si, pick Bi ⊆ Si such that |Bi| = bi. Now we show that Bi is a maximum
independent subset of Si. We need to verify the following properties:
• rank(Si) ≤ bi. This is true since for any S ⊆ Si, if S is independent, then |S ∩Si| ≤ h({i}) =
bi.
• Bi is independent. Only need to show that for any J , |Bi ∩ S(J)| ≤ h(J). When i ∈ J ,
|J | ≥ 2, h(J) = bi +
∑
j 6=i,j∈J bj − µ|J | ≥ bi + (|J − 1|)bmin − |J |µ ≥ bi since µ = 14bmin.
When i 6∈ J , |Bi ∩S(J)| ≤
∑
j∈J |Bi ∩Sj | ≤
∑
j∈J |Si ∩Sj | ≤ |J | · 2µ < 3µ|J | ≤ h(J). Thus
Bi ∈ I, then Bi is independent.
Thus for any b ∈ [bmin, bmax]N , f(Si) = bi can be extended to a feasible matroid rank function.
B A constant upper bound for special demand distributions
In Section 4 we proved that we cannot obtain an o(log n)-approximation to deterministic subadditive
pricing via simple mechanisms for arbitrary distributions over valuation functions. However, when
the distributions satisfy a certain property simple mechanisms, in particular item or bundle pricings,
are able to do better.
Definition B.1. Given a deterministic Sybil-proof pricing p and a distribution D over valuations,
the demand distribution Πp,D is the distribution over sets of items that specifies the random set
of items bought by a buyer with value drawn from D under pricing p: for all S ⊆ [n], Πp,D(S) =
Prv∼D[S = arg maxT⊆[n](v(T )− p(T ))].10
Observe that for any pricing p and value distribution D, the revenue of the pricing is precisely
Ev∼D[p(v)] = ES∼Πp,D [p(S)]. We will now show that if the buyer is single-minded and the demand
distribution is a product distribution over items, then the revenue of p can be approximated by a
simple pricing.
Theorem B.1. Given a deterministic monotone subadditive pricing function p and value dis-
tribution D over single-minded values, suppose that the demand distribution Πp,D is a product
distribution over items, then RevD(p) < 22.67 max(SRevD,BRevD).
10Generally speaking, specifying the demand distribution requires specifying a tie-breaking rule between multiple
sets of equal utility. We will focus here on single-minded buyers, so the possibility of tie-breaking will not arise.
18
Proof. As in the work of [19], we will break up set of items and correspondingly the revenue obtained
by p into two components: over one of these components, a.k.a. the core, the price will concentrate
around its expectation and can be approximated using a bundle pricing; over the other, a.k.a. the
tail, a significant fraction of the revenue will be contributed by singleton items and can be recovered
using an item pricing.
We write Π as shorthand for Πp,D. Number the items in decreasing order of their individual
prices: p({1}) ≥ p({2}) ≥ · · · ≥ p({n}). For items i ∈ [n] let pii denote the marginal probability that
i is purchased, that is, pii = PrS∼Π[i ∈ S]. Find the index k ∈ [n] such that pi1 + pi2 + · · ·+ pik < 12
and pi1 +pi2 + · · ·+pik+1 ≥ 12 . The high value, low probability items {1, 2, · · · , k} will form the tail,
and the remaining items will form the core. For any subset S ⊆ [n], define STAIL = S∩{1, 2, · · · , k}
and SCORE = S ∩ {k + 1, · · · , n}. By the subadditivity of p we have p(S) ≤ p(STAIL) + p(SCORE).
Therefore, ES∼Π[p(STAIL)] + ES∼Π[p(SCORE)] is an upper bound of the revenue of p.
We will first bound the contribution of the core, ES∼Π[p(SCORE)] using the following concen-
tration lemma for subadditive functions from [20]. To apply the lemma, we observe that p(SCORE)
is Lipschitz with a Lipschitz constant of maxi>k p({i}) = p({k + 1}) because SCORE contains only
items with index larger than k.
Theorem B.2. (Corollary 12 from [20]) Suppose that f(X) is a non-negative c-Lipschitz subaddi-
tive function, where X ∈ {0, 1}n is drawn from a product distribution D. If a is the median of f ,
then for any k > 0, PrX∼D[f(X) ≥ 3a+ k] ≤ 22−k/c.
Setting a = medianS∼Π(p(SCORE)) and c = p({k + 1}), we obtain
ES∼Π[p(SCORE)] =
∫
t≥0
Pr[p(SCORE) > t]dt ≤ 3a+
∫
k≥0
22−k/cdk = 3a+
4
ln 2
c.
We now observe that we can recover both of the terms above using a bundle pricing. In particular,
by setting a constant bundle price of a, we obtain a revenue of aPrv∼D[v([n]) > a] ≥ aPrS∼Π[p(S) >
a] ≥ aPrS∼Π[p(SCORE) > a] = a/2. On the other hand, by setting a constant bundle price of c,
we obtain a revenue of cPrv∼D[v([n]) > c] ≥ cPrS∼Π[p(S) > c] ≥ cPrS∼Π[∃i ≤ k + 1 : i ∈ S]. The
latter probability can be bounded from below as:
Pr
S∼Π
[∃i ≤ k+ 1, i ∈ S] = 1− (1−pi1)(1−pi2) · · · (1−pik+1) ≥ 1−
(
1−
∑
i≤k+1 pii
k + 1
)k+1
≥ 1− e−1/2,
where the first inequality follows by applying Jensen’s inequality, and the second follows by using∑
i≤k+1 pii ≥ 12 .
Thus we can bound E[p(SCORE)] as follows:
E[p(SCORE)] ≤ 3a+ 4
ln 2
c ≤ 6BRev+ 4
(1− e−1/2) ln 2BRev < 20.67BRev.
Now we bound E[p(STAIL)]. By subadditivity,
E[p(STAIL)] ≤ E
∑
i≤k
p(STAIL ∩ {i})
 = ∑
i≤k
piip({i}).
Recall that pi1 +pi2 + · · ·+pik ≤ 12 . Consider the additive pricing that sells items in {1, 2, · · · , k} at
item prices qi = p({i}), and allocates items i > k for free.
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Consider a buyer that purchases a set S under pricing p with STAIL = {i}. In the pricing q, the
buyer continues to afford the set S at a lower price of qi = p({i}) < p(S). Therefore, the revenue of
the pricing q from this buyer is at least qi = p({i}). Since this buyer is instantiated with probability
at least Pr[STAIL = {i}] ≥ 12pii, we get that E[p(STAIL)] ≤ 2RevD(q) ≤ 2SRev. Then combining
the above cases we get RevD(p) ≤ 22.67 max(SRevD,BRevD).
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